First, the RTI is an outside measure. That is, it came about after a campaign by non-state actors. Its modus operandi thus makes it only partially effective as the burden of initiative disproportionately falls on a largely unorganised citizenry whose priority is to provide for their families and not spend personal resources (or time) collecting evidence against malpractices of the state. No one has an incentive to singly bear the costs, and thus the desired outcome doesnt happen. For example, individually, it is rational for every private contractor approaching the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to pay a bribe (given the cumbersome processes involved), to get an edge over other contractors in a given time frame rather than wasting time unearthing the loopholes in a competitive bidding process. Thus, the incentive to collectivise and demand a corrupt-free MCD isnt there. What does this mean? For contractor No 1, his RTI petition may bear fruit and he may be vindicated. But for contractor No 2, facing same issues, the benefit from the previous investigation is limited unless contractor No 1s efforts have become a catalyst for institutional change. In other words results from the RTI are not immediately scalable or cumulative; rather the wheel must be reinvented each time by each individual. There is no class action version of the RTI which can hold an entire organisation responsible and compensate all those who have suffered.
This is also the reason why the RTI still needs powerful activists. Indeed, it has been successful in places where the likes of Parivartans Arvind Kejriwal have collectivised and held entire systems accountable, Delhis Public Distribution System being one such case. Without a collectivising body the RTI in its current form does not bring about systemic change though it might provide individuals incentives to bear the costs of filing an RTI because the benefits largely accrue to them. Understandably, if the benefits accrued to everyone, no one would file an RTI, hoping to free-ride on RTIs filed by others.
Secondly, the RTI remains without sufficient bite. A number of security agencies still remain beyond its scope. In an environment where the country debates the balance between civil liberties, privacy and national security, it is highly unlikely that archaic legislations like the 1923 Official Secrets Act, which contains several provisions prohibiting the flow of information from the government to ordinary people, will be reformed. Similarly, the present conduct rules for civil servants prohibit disclosure of official information to ordinary citizens. This is a large obstacle in the way of the RTI. After all, while the existing law prohibits government officials from sharing information, it is the same civil servant who has to facilitate RTI requests for information. How can the RTI be effective if those accused are meant to provide photocopies of inquires against themselves? Their incentive is to delay and dodge the process till litigation consumes it.
Fourthly, the threats of parliamentary amendments always gather around this legislation. If enacted, they would undo the gains from the movement. Most importantly, the rural-urban divide in applications remains wide. The RTI requires an aware and educated individual to understand his rights; sadly that is not the case with most citizens. Thus, the RTI is not likely to bring about accountability.
What India deserves is immediate institutional reform, spearheaded by the present institutional leadership. Unlike the RTI, that will have to be endogenous change, built first on the acceptance that things are not right in-house. It is not, as has been concluded, all about political will because Parliament is only one of many dysfunctional institutions. Still, committed leadership explains the difference between a successful PSU and a crumbling one. Once the system is made bigger and smarter than individuals, the likelihood of breaking rules diminishes. That is the goal of systemic change.
The writer is a Delhi-based political economy researcher.