IE : How do we generate collective action to address the supply side of corruption? : Oct 19,2007
State of complicity
How do we generate collective action to address the supply side of corruption?
How do we generate collective action to address the supply side of corruption?
Yamini Aiyer
W HY is it that, for a country which is experiencing record breaking economic growth with nascent super power aspirations, we have been so unsuccessful in tackling corruption? As the recent World Bank investigation on health care projects reported in this newspaper reveals, the malaise of corruption pervades through our governance structures. India ranks 108th out of 205 countries on the World Bank’s control of corruption index. According to Transparency International, Indians spend over Rs 210 billion annually on corruption.
Understanding why requires an analysis of the current market for corruption. As in any market demand (the bribetaker) and supply (the complicit bribe-giver) operate in tandem. Much of the focus has been on the demand side and we are all familiar with these arguments. The need of the day is radical administrative reform. But this requires strong political will, which is conspicuous by its absence.
This brings us to the second and relatively under-discussed aspect of the market for corruption – its supply side. Is it not extraordinary that in an effective, well functioning electoral democracy, corruption has almost never been a significant electoral issue at any level – national, state or local Panchayat?
Some answers to this puzzle can be found in an analysis of the supply side of corruption. For this, we need to make a distinction between the different experiences of corruption across sections of society. Failures of collective action are an outcome of these distinct ways in which corruption is experienced and responses are framed.
First, let us look at corruption amongst the poorest; for whom access to government programmes is a matter of survival. A study on corruption levels in Orissa revealed that a poor citizen had to go through 11 stages of bureaucratic and political hurdles and pay bribes of over Rs 2,000 to access a death compensation of Rs 75,000. For someone living on less than Rs 40 a day, Rs 2,000 is a significant amount of money, but this is paid out of necessity. Collective action amongst the poorest is difficult because of the very vulnerabilities that make coercion possible – they are unaware of their rights and often locked in exploitative patronclient relationships.
Let’s now turn to cor ruption amongst the relatively better off – the elites in rural societies. For them the state is a means of fulfilling greater aspirations of social mobility, and corruption is part of the deal. This needs to be understood in the context of the political economy of the Indian state. As many have argued, the statist model of development created numerous spaces for patronage dispensation in Indian polity. The resulting nexus between the politician, bureaucrat and local elites has meant that the state and its apparatus are treated not so much as a space for generating public goods, but for the accumulation of private wealth. And therefore, for them collusiveness in corruption is a means to an end, and corruption is legitimised as part of a larger system that offers economic and social opportunities. Legitimacy precludes any possibility of collective action.
Finally, we come to the middle classes and the urban elite who offer the most vocal moral critique of corruption and yet remain willing participants. For them, complicity is a marginal tax for the enormous benefits they get by easing through the system. Think of the number of times you have succumbed to paying a bribe to the traffic cop or the electricity department because it makes life easier. So then, what are the incentives to mobilise for change?
But shouldn’t we also be focusing on the consequences of our complicity?
Tackling corruption requires addressing the demand and supply side of the corruption market. There is no shortage of proposals on ways to reform the public sector. How do we generate collective action across the class spectrum to address the supply side? We can draw lessons from experiences both within and outside India. The movement for the right to information and related social audits provides a useful framework for thinking about ways of empowering the poorest and most vulnerable to demand accountability. Generating collective action amongst other sections of society requires a somewhat different strategy. Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) is an interesting model to learn from. The ICAC adopted a proactive strategy of public awareness particularly in schools on the ethics of corruption, which analysts say led to an increase in complaints of corruption and changed public attitudes.
In India the media can play a similar role through public awareness campaigns and constructing sustained debates on the market for corruption. Information is key to generating public interest and often serves as a catalyst for mobilisation. Civil society is already beginning to fill the information gap through studies on the status of public services. These could be extended to looking more systematically at levels of corruption and the work of anti-corruption agencies. Finally, we cannot as a society get away from taking collective responsibility for our state of affairs. We have to stop being complacent and interrogate our own complicity to move forward.
The writer is a freelance consultant working on issues of governance reform yaiyar@gmail.com
Understanding why requires an analysis of the current market for corruption. As in any market demand (the bribetaker) and supply (the complicit bribe-giver) operate in tandem. Much of the focus has been on the demand side and we are all familiar with these arguments. The need of the day is radical administrative reform. But this requires strong political will, which is conspicuous by its absence.
This brings us to the second and relatively under-discussed aspect of the market for corruption – its supply side. Is it not extraordinary that in an effective, well functioning electoral democracy, corruption has almost never been a significant electoral issue at any level – national, state or local Panchayat?
Some answers to this puzzle can be found in an analysis of the supply side of corruption. For this, we need to make a distinction between the different experiences of corruption across sections of society. Failures of collective action are an outcome of these distinct ways in which corruption is experienced and responses are framed.
First, let us look at corruption amongst the poorest; for whom access to government programmes is a matter of survival. A study on corruption levels in Orissa revealed that a poor citizen had to go through 11 stages of bureaucratic and political hurdles and pay bribes of over Rs 2,000 to access a death compensation of Rs 75,000. For someone living on less than Rs 40 a day, Rs 2,000 is a significant amount of money, but this is paid out of necessity. Collective action amongst the poorest is difficult because of the very vulnerabilities that make coercion possible – they are unaware of their rights and often locked in exploitative patronclient relationships.
Let’s now turn to cor ruption amongst the relatively better off – the elites in rural societies. For them the state is a means of fulfilling greater aspirations of social mobility, and corruption is part of the deal. This needs to be understood in the context of the political economy of the Indian state. As many have argued, the statist model of development created numerous spaces for patronage dispensation in Indian polity. The resulting nexus between the politician, bureaucrat and local elites has meant that the state and its apparatus are treated not so much as a space for generating public goods, but for the accumulation of private wealth. And therefore, for them collusiveness in corruption is a means to an end, and corruption is legitimised as part of a larger system that offers economic and social opportunities. Legitimacy precludes any possibility of collective action.
Finally, we come to the middle classes and the urban elite who offer the most vocal moral critique of corruption and yet remain willing participants. For them, complicity is a marginal tax for the enormous benefits they get by easing through the system. Think of the number of times you have succumbed to paying a bribe to the traffic cop or the electricity department because it makes life easier. So then, what are the incentives to mobilise for change?
But shouldn’t we also be focusing on the consequences of our complicity?
Tackling corruption requires addressing the demand and supply side of the corruption market. There is no shortage of proposals on ways to reform the public sector. How do we generate collective action across the class spectrum to address the supply side? We can draw lessons from experiences both within and outside India. The movement for the right to information and related social audits provides a useful framework for thinking about ways of empowering the poorest and most vulnerable to demand accountability. Generating collective action amongst other sections of society requires a somewhat different strategy. Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) is an interesting model to learn from. The ICAC adopted a proactive strategy of public awareness particularly in schools on the ethics of corruption, which analysts say led to an increase in complaints of corruption and changed public attitudes.
In India the media can play a similar role through public awareness campaigns and constructing sustained debates on the market for corruption. Information is key to generating public interest and often serves as a catalyst for mobilisation. Civil society is already beginning to fill the information gap through studies on the status of public services. These could be extended to looking more systematically at levels of corruption and the work of anti-corruption agencies. Finally, we cannot as a society get away from taking collective responsibility for our state of affairs. We have to stop being complacent and interrogate our own complicity to move forward.
The writer is a freelance consultant working on issues of governance reform yaiyar@gmail.com
Publication : IE; Section : MN; Pg : 1; Date : 22/10/07
URL : http://70.86.150.130/indianexpress/ArticleText.aspx?article=19_10_2007_011_010